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Scientific Verses: Subversion of Cartesian Theory and
Practice in the "Discours a Madame de La Sabliere"
Russell Ganim
BACKGROUND AND DEFINITIONS

Study of the relationship between science and La Fontaine's Fables has a
limited, but thought-provoking past. Beverly Ridgely asserts that while La
Fontaine represents himself mainly as an "artist" and "moralist" concerned with
depicting the irony and comedy of life, he "also had a genuinely studious and
reflective side... [with] a real aspiration to write scientific philosophical verse in
emulation of such ancient masters as Lucretius and Virgil" (180). Ridgely
analyzes the influence of late seventeenth-century cosmic theory on L'astrologue
qui se laisse tomber dans un puits and L'horoscope. The two poems attack the
concept of judicial astrology, which claimed to foretell the future through observation of the heavens. La Fontaine's complaint against judicial astrology, according to Ridgely, was that it constituted a "pseudo-science in which... [the
poet] saw both an infringement on Divine Providence and an affront to common
sense and experience—in short a striking instance of human presumption and
folly" (182). My aim is to prove that La Fontaine, in his Discours a Madame de
La Sabliere, accuses Descartes of the same presumption, and affront to common
sense.
In the fables mentioned, La Fontaine bases his critique of both questionable
and legitimate scientific theory on the works of Gassendi as summarized in
Francois Bernier's Abrege de la philosophic de Gassendi (1678).1 Gassendi contends that any form of absolute knowledge is impossible. According to Richard
Popkin, Gassendi argues that "the world of experience or appearance... [serves] as
the sole basis for our natural knowledge" (101). GassendFs relativism, then, contradicts Descartes's theories of certitude based on scientific reasoning and the existence of God. Ridgely, while discussing the influence of "gassendisme" on the
Discours a Madame de La Sabliere, briefly focuses on the central argument in the
poem: that animals exercise some measure of thought and will and therefore do
not, contrary to Descartes, comprise simple "machines." By mentioning the issue of "1'ame des betes," Ridgely evokes the debate sparked by Rene Jasinski and
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Henri Busson in the 1930s over the origins of La Fontaine's views of the animal
mind and soul. In general, Jasinski argues for the influence of Gassendi and
Bernier, while Busson, and later Ferdinand Gohin, assert that La Fontaine's beliefs about animal intelligence stemmed from the Jesuit Gaston Pardies's
Discours de la connaissance des Bestes, as well as the writings of J.-B. Du
Hamel. Although a valuable source study of one of La Fontaine's most noted
poems, the Jasinski-Busson debate raises and answers few questions.
The goal of this study is not to uncover additional works that La Fontaine
may have consulted while formulating his theory of animal intelligence. Rather,
I will examine further the poet's treatment of Cartesianism in the Discours a
Madame de La Sabliere. La Fontaine's anti-Cartesianism extends far beyond disagreement over the nature of the animal mind. Specifically, his refutation of
Descartes involves style, method, and structure, as much as theme. In effect, the
Discours a Madame de La Sabliere can be read as a refutation to the Discours de
la methode4 in which La Fontaine purposely employs Cartesian procedure, language, and narrative point of view to undercut concepts fundamental to the geometer's argument.
What does one call this poem? La Fontaine offers four main possibilities,
labeling his work at once a "louange" (v. 11), an "entretien" (vv. 15, 20), a
"fable" (v. 25), as well as the "discours" of the title. In large measure, all of
these terms apply, but I will argue that the expression "discours" is most appropriate, especially for understanding the philosophical dimension of La Fontaine's
project. "Fable," which I will discuss at the end of the essay, deals more with the
literary tradition to which the work belongs, thus resolving questions of genre
rather than framing scientific debate. With respect to the first term, "louange,"
the text praises not only the poet's patron Madame de la Sabliere (here addressed
as "Iris"), but more importantly animals and their cognitive powers.
Nonetheless, as the work develops into an attack on Cartesian theory, the critical
aspect of the poem overtakes the laudatory, thereby diminishing the word's importance. Busson and Gohin, in their 1938 critical edition of La Fontaine's
Discours, give no interpretation of "louange," but do attach large importance to
the word "entretien," arguing that it best explains the substantive "Discours" in
the title (59).
Unfortunately, Busson and Gohin give little indication as to what
"entretien" meant in the seventeenth century. Furetiere speaks of "entretien" primarily in terms of "la conversation," with the verb "entretenir" meaning
"Discourir avec plusieurs personnes" (3:863). A second definition appears, relating "entretien" to the concepts of maintenance and preservation, i.e., "de la
conservation, la depense pour reparer une chose" (863). In this definition,
"entretenir" signifies "tenir une chose liee, assemblee." If taken figuratively, the
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equation of "entretien" with "rehabilitation" or "conservation" suggests a kind of
custodianship with respect to ideas and objects. One could argue that while the
meaning of "entretien" as "conversation" seems initially plausible, its meaning
as "conservation" also applies since La Fontaine sees himself in this poem as
the custodian of an intellectual tradition upholding the cognitive powers of animals. Collinet's remark that the Discours a Madame de La Sabliere represents La
Fontaine's adaptation of the Apologie de Raimond Sebond lends credence to this
idea (1239). La Fontaine's preservation and development of this tradition becomes especially important in light of Descartes's opposition to it.
Nonetheless, the definition of "entretien" as "conversation" warrants closer
attention. On the one hand, the poem reveals very little in the way of strict dialogue, i.e., direct speech between two or more persons. On the other hand, the
poem can be seen as a dramatic monologue in which the interlocutor's reactions
can be detected by the speaker's movements and adaptations. I shall deal with the
first scenario now, and the second in the next section. While one could posit
that La Fontaine's dedication to Madame de La Sabliere and his subsequent appeal to "Iris" constitute a form of conversation with his patron, it should be
noted that Iris never speaks. Although Iris is undoubtedly the narratee, neither
she, nor the animals, possess language. When considering the most stringent
definition of "entretien," one remarks that the poet bestows language only upon
himself, presenting a univocal work arguing a particular point of view. Granted,
La Fontaine's opposition to Descartes thrusts the poet into the scientific controversy of his day. Yet, the text's expository format and rigor, coupled with the
absence of direct discourse signals that a "entretien," au sens propre, falls short
in its application to La Fontaine's poem. The term "discours," however, if taken
to mean a reasoned argument, gives the best description of the poem's form, and
especially its function.
Collinet's edition sheds little light on the meaning of either "entretien" or
"discours." Nonetheless, the term "discours," (J. Alien Tyier, Concordance 289)
appears 58 times: 28 times in the Fables, 30 in the Contes. Two basic meanings
of the term emerge: the first refers to a theory or thesis, "Se peut connaitre au
discours quej'avance" (1.19:21) (289), the second denotes overt speech or dialogue, "Est-ce a moi que 1'on tient de semblables discours?" (12.5:15) (289). The
expression "discours" appears in the title of only one other fable, the Discours a
Monsieur de La Rochefoucauld. Like the Discours a Madame de La Sabliere, this
poem treats the subject of animal intelligence, drawing numerous parallels
between human and animal behavior. The poet states that he will "prove" (v. 9)
his contention that humans and animals share a kernel of common "esprit,"
which he describes in verse 7 as "Quelque grain d'une masse ou puisent les
esprits." He then cites several examples and/or observations to back his claim.
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Pierre Michel and Maurice Martin note the use of the term "argument,"
interpreting it as a "raisonnement." The deductive process by which the poet
draws his conclusions lends credence to their interpretation. Nevertheless, further
analysis of the term will better illuminate its function in La Fontaine's project.
Busson and Gohin give a rather contradictory analysis of what the word
"discours" means. In their introduction, they contend that the term signifies a
"dissertation," or didactic writing (9). Busson and Gohin's notes, however, blur
this definition by stating that "Discours n'a pas Ie sens actuel de developpement
oratoire, ni Ie sens frequent du dix-septieme siecle de traite" (59). While one can
accept the reluctance to associate La Fontaine's poem with a speech, it is difficult to see the difference between "dissertation" and "traite." Furetiere suggests
that the terms are interchangeable, and defines "disserter" as meaning "discourir"
(3:180). Busson and Gohin's conclusion that "discours" most accurately signals
an "entretien" (59), is debatable for the reasons already mentioned. The brevity of
Busson and Gohin's remarks on the meaning of "discours" as well as the lack of
other research on the subject prompts one to examine the text closely so as to
derive La Fontaine's conception of the term.
Much of La Fontaine's language points to a conceptualization of "discours"
as a "propos" or an "expose" that operates particularly on a demonstrative level.
At the core of this "expose" is the aforementioned "raisonnement." Forms of the
words "raisonner," "penser" and "reflechir" (vv. 58-64) appear frequently in the
text, with the poem's last image that of reason piercing through the darkness
(vv. 234-37). This final image of light is consonant with the poem's
demonstrative structure and tone. As I will show, the bulk of La Fontaine's
Discours consists of observations which refute Descartes's theory that animals
possess neither will nor thought independent of their physiology. The
demonstration is largely deductive in that it starts with the general premise that
animals have cognitive powers, and moves to specific examples which support
the premise. La Fontaine reinforces the demonstrative, illuminative tone of the
Discours through language that suggests visual means of perception. "Discours,"
then, in the sense of an "expose" which brings thought to light, most accurately
summarizes La Fontaine's project of revealing a truth which he feels has been
clouded or obscured by Descartes's incorrect "exposition" on the subject.
OCULOCENTRISM AND IRIS AS NARRATEE

Perhaps the most salient example of the poem's emphasis on vision, or
oculocentrism, is La Fontaine's reference to Madame de La Sabliere as Iris.
Critics have done little to explain La Fontaine's sobriquet for his patron.
Fumaroli and Collinet briefly discuss the mythological significance of the term
indicating Iris as the Goddess of the Rainbow, while Busson and Gohin merely
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state that "La Fontaine aimait a donner un nom de Parnasse a ses protectrices"
(59). However, I believe that the name bears larger significance when the different contexts of the poem are examined. Since the work debates a scientific question of the day, the fields of biology and physics provide a good point of entry
into the name's meaning. Long before the late seventeenth century, iris in
French denoted the colored section of the eye surrounding the pupil. Furetiere describes the iris as "un cercle qui est autour de la prunelle de 1'oeil, & qui est de
differentes couleurs, tantot noir, tantot bleu, tantot vert. C'est un tissu de fibres
disposees en rond, qui viennent de la tunique qu'on appelle 'Uvee' ou "choroide"'
(4:1566). Emphasis on the eye, especially at the beginning of the text, suggests
that viewpoint and outlook weigh heavily in the poem's interpretation. The
poet's repeated appeal to Iris, especially at the beginning or end of a specific
point in his argument, underscores the Goddess's and, by extension, the reader's
role as judge in the debate between La Fontaine and Descartes.
The role of judge or mediator provides leads into discussion of Iris as narratee. Gerald Prince defines the narratee as "someone whom the narrator addresses
(7)" either directly or indirectly within the text. In La Fontaine's case, Iris's
presence within the text is quite distinct, as her name is mentioned four times
(vv. 1, 11, 61, 172). Prince outlines several functions and signals of the
narratee, many of which can be applied to explain Iris's role, as well as the
poet's relationship to her. Iris's presence as a judge leads the reader to view her
as a "listener" or "mediator" (19) who stands as "a relay between the narrator and
the reader(s), or rather between the author and the reader(s)" (21). Prince goes on
to describe this function: "Should certain values have to be defended or certain
ambiguities clarified, this can easily be done by means of asides addressed to the
narratee" (21). Indeed, at particular moments when the narrator tries to underscore
his opposition to Descartes, he appeals to his arbiter:
Or vous savez, Iris, de certaine science,
Que, quand la bete penserait,
La bete ne reflechirait
Sur lobjet ni sur sa pensee.
Descartes va plus loin, et soutient nettement
Qu'elle ne pense nullement.
(vv.61-66)

In this, as well as other instances. Iris represents not only a mediator in the abstract, but the actual Madame de La Sabliere whose salons fostered debate between Cartesians and "gassendistes" such as La Fontaine.
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Appeal to a narratee of Madame de La Sabliere's status also helps in the
characterization of the narrator—another of Prince's functions of the narratee
(22). A poetic, yet philosophical discourse directed to Madame de La Sabliere
raises the esteem of the narrator in the public's eye. If the poet's argument is
worthy of admission to her salon, then the reliability and prestige of the one advancing the argument is increased manifold. The very notion that someone of
Iris's status would entertain the poet's ideas already places the poet in high standing.
Along with the clear references to Iris, subtler allusions exist which suggest
her participation. Here, the notion of dramatic monologue becomes important
since in dramatic monologue, "[the poem] gains additional force from the fact
that a silent auditor often constrains or controls the speaker's words" (Princeton
Encyclopedia 799). Prince's "signals of the narratee" (11) include the suggested
presence of the narratee "in the form of questions or pseudo-questions" (13-14).
Here, questions in the narrative spring neither from a character nor the narrator
(14). Rather, the questions, which often serve to advance an argument or provide
information about the plot or characters, are ascribed to the narratee. These questions fall into the second category of signals distinguishing the narratee, those
which inform the public that the narratee has shared similar experiences or feelings with the reader. Prince's example of this second category, taken from
Flaubert's Un coeur simple, underscores the presence of the narratee by referring
to Felicite's "confusion" in meeting M. Bourais as something "into which we
are all thrown by the spectacle of extraordinary men" (12). The "we" calls upon
the narratee to compare his experience to Felicite's, with the aim of finding
commonality, if not empathy. In the Discours a Madame de La Sabliere, a situation which summons the narratee through both questions and common experience occurs at the end of the poet's praise of the Ukrainian boubaks' military
prowess:
Pour chanter leurs combats, 1'Acheron nous devrait
Rendre Homere. Ah! s'il Ie rendait.
Et qu'il rendit aussi Ie rival d'Epicure,
Que dirait ce dernier sur ces exemples-ci?
(vv. 136-39)

Having Homer sing the conquests of the Boubaks gives Iris a point of reference
by which to judge the animals' skill in war. "Nous" (v. 136), in its most immediate sense, designates the poet and Iris, with the allusion to Homeric epic suggesting a common, but sophisticated standard by which to represent the animals'
might. However, the presence of the narratee becomes most evocative in the
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question that ends the passage, "Que dirait ce dernier sur ces exemples-ci?" (v.
139) The inquiry, while possibly a rhetorical device on the part of the narrator,
can be explained as a contribution from the narratee. As Iris's presence has already been implied in the word "nous," it is not implausible to assume her participation in some manner. The question, in which "ce dernier" refers to
Descartes, refocuses the Discours on La Fontaine's opposition to the philosopher. After more than 60 lines of examples of animal intelligence, the original
opposition has been reestablished, and Iris's function as arbiter resumed. "Que dirait ce dernier sur ces exemples-ci" becomes her way of getting the poet to consider what kind of rebuttal his argument may encounter. The next two lines articulate the poet's answer:
Ce quej'ai deja dit: qu'aux betes la nature
Peut par les seuls ressorts operer tout ceci.
(w. 140-41)
The "je" affirms the poet's presence not only in his dialogue with Descartes, but
with Iris as well. His restatement of things he has "already said" underscores the
repetition and continuity of discourse carried on at many different levels.
On a symbolic level, the link between Iris and the rainbow, particularly the
physical property of refracting light through water, touches on La Fontaine's
overall goal of subverting Descartes. From a rhetorical standpoint, the poet refracts, or changes the direction of Descartes's method to prove the antithesis of
the geometer's argument. Notions such as the "cogito", "bon sens", and experience will demonstrate that animals do indeed think. The principle of refraction
also anticipates the intended public's reaction to the text. Specifically, the eye's
ability to change the path of incoming light in order to form an image on the
retina mirrors the reader's capacity to alter his/her reception of a given idea so as
to create a new image of this idea. La Fontaine will pass Descartes's method and
precepts through a different lens, thereby creating new means by which to view
the philosopher's theories. It is now a question of exploring these methods and
precepts in greater detail.
DUALISM, EXCLUSION, AND THE PRIMACY OF THE MIND

Most of the Cartesian principles that La Fontaine attacks come from the
Discours de la methode. In all likelihood, then, one reason why La Fontaine
chooses to include the term "discours" in his poem's title is to underscore his
opposition to Descartes. The idea in La Fontaine's Discours that "la bete est une
machine" (v. 30) derives from Descartes's theory of animal behavior first postulated in the Traite de I'homme (Adam and Tannery 130-32), then reiterated in Part
107

REFIGURING LA FONTAINE

V of the Discours de la methode (Robinet edition 90-92). Descartes argues here
for the concept of animals as "automates, ou machines mouvantes (90) [qui] n'agiraient pas par connaissance mats seulement par la disposition de leurs organes"
(91). The contention that animals are without reason finds various means of expression, of which the most notable are an animal's lack of speech (Oeuvres
philosophiques, 1:628-30). Descartes asserts that "elles [les betes/machines] ne
pourraient user de paroles, ni d'autres signes en les composant comme nous
faisons pour declarer aux autres nos pensees" (629). Even if, Descartes argues,
animals such as parrots pronounce words in the same manner as humans, they
cannot think about what they say (630). By contrast, while deaf-mute humans
may be unable to enunciate words, they often invent signals by which they can
make themselves understood. The key to distinguishing animals from humans
for Descartes is the being's ability to think before it attempts to communicate.
Thought presupposes the capacity to create tangible, systematic signs through
which meanings and exchanges may take place. In other words, the lack of codified language in animals leads Descartes to the conclusion, "pas seulement que
les betes out moins de raison que les hommes, mais qu'elles n'en ont point du
tout" (630). Later in Part V, the machine metaphor takes over much of
Descartes's argument, as he asserts that nature directs animal movement much
the way wheels and springs direct the function of a clock (Robinet 93).
The mechanical conception of animal life rests on Descartes's assumption of
the dual nature of mind and body, of "esprit" and "corps." Dualism results not
only from the distinction of mind and body, but from the primacy of the mind in
directing human consciousness. Descartes asserts that it is only through the
mind, "a solo intellectu" (429) that the body, and indeed anything, can be perceived. The mind/body distinction subdivides into two concepts, that of res cogitans, (420-21) or thinking substance, and res extensa, (400) or extended, i.e. material substance, both of which are mutually exclusive. Part V of the Discours de
la methode bears early witness to this dualism in the contrast between humans
and animals. Humans occupy the domain of res cogitans, while animals are reduced to the level of extended substance which assumes a mechanistic form. Of
note in Descartes's verification of his theory is his concept of animals as neargeometrical beings. He explains his approach in the Abrege des six meditations
as:

[la suite] d'un ordre semblable a celui dont se servent la
geometres, [a] savoir d'avancer toutes les choses desquelles
dependent la proposition que 1'on cherche avant d'en rien conclure. (Oeuvres philosophiques 2:400)
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The "proposition" guiding Descartes's dissections and experiments in Part V of
the Discours, as well as the Traite de I'homme and La description du corps humain(Adsim and Tannery 11:119-286), is that not only the circulatory system,
but the movement of all material things must be proven by "la force des demonstrations mathematiques" which translate into "raisonnements conformes aux
principes du mecanisme" (Oeuvres philosophiques 1:599-600). Geometrical reasoning, while empirical, concerns itself less with common experience than with
sequences of logic stemming from a given principle. Descartes finds this type of
verification sufficient because his dissections center on how one part of an extended substance, an organ, for example, influences and moves the other parts as
well as the whole. Of greatest importance is seeing how a distinctive experiment
contributes to the process of demonstrating a given concept, in this case, the
mechanistic character of the animal (and for that matter, human) body.
The goal ofDescartes's exclusionary contrast between human and animal natures is to argue for the existence of a human soul. He states that the composition of the human spirit extends far beyond the elements of physical matter.
Unlike animals' nature, man's is independent of the body, and thus "not subject
to die with him" (632). Consequently, immortality becomes the largest distinction between man and animal, with the existence of the mind the crucial factor in
extending human life beyond the terrestrial realm.
ASSIMILATION. HIERARCHY, AND REFUTATION

While La Fontaine's Discours constitutes the poet's firmest rejection of
Descartes's propositions, other texts echo the same sentiment. Along with the
Discours a Monsieur de La Rochefoucauld, fables such as L'Homme et la
couleuvre and La perdrix et les coqs discuss the qualities of animals in their own
right. As in the Discours a Madame de La Sabliere, the poet often depicts animal
intelligence and virtue as superior to those of their human counterparts. What
distinguishes La Fontaine's Discours from the aforementioned works is the
poet's systematic refutation of a known scientific theory. This systematization
expresses itself in two structures of thought 1) an assimilative method of
discourse and 2) an inferential method of discourse. The first represents a
departure from Descartes's mode of argument, while the second evokes many
similarities.
Briefly, La Fontaine's assimilative method distances itself from Cartesian
dualism. While the poet agrees with Descartes that the mind and body should be
considered separately, distinctions between mind and body, between human and
animal do not concern La Fontaine as much as classifications or scales of beings. Throughout his Discours, but especially in the closing verses, La Fontaine
tends to rank different life forms according to their degree of consciousness. In
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the hierarchy of terrestrial life, adult humans constitute the highest order of life,
with children and animals second in line, followed by plants. Like Descartes, La
Fontaine distinguishes between what he sees as superior and inferior manifestations of being. Yet, for La Fontaine, differentiation is not necessarily exclusionary. Rather, differentiation evolves into a process of distinction where comparisons, not simply contrasts, are taken into account when determining the nature
of a specific creature.
In the poet's view, all living beings, plant or animal, share some common
life functions and experiences such as breathing and reproduction. The more
complex these functions and experiences, the higher the degree of consciousness.
La Fontaine bases his supposition on intuition and "bon sens," concluding that
the hierarchy of life forms is self-evident:
Ce queje sais, Iris, c'est qu'en ces animaux
Dontje viens de citer 1'exemple,
Cet esprit n'agit pas: 1'homme seui est son temple.
Aussi faut-il donner a 1'animal un point
Que la plante, apres tout, n'a point.
(vv. 172-76)

Unlike Descartes, La Fontaine verifies his assumptions through common experience as opposed to controlled experiments designed to conform to an established
chain of reasoning.
In examining the particular natures and dispositions of different species, the
poet again seeks similarities and differences. The four examples of animal intelligence in La Fontaine's Discours reveal a differentiative and an assimilative
mode of reasoning, with La Fontaine underscoring either similarities or differences between the animals according to the context. In the illustrations mentioned, the prime trait animals share is an ability to confront and overcome an
obstacle through reason. What distinguishes each animal is its particular means
of coping with the problem. The birds, rats, and deer engage in various ruses
(vv. 73-91), while the beavers and boubaks (vv. 92-138) display their respective
engineering and military skills. The result is a general awareness of animal
cognition, which finds many expressions and functions given the different
circumstances. La Fontaine thus strives to refute Descartes's assertion "Que les
betes n'ont point d'esprit" (v. 198) by cultivating the public's appreciation of
specific manifestations of animal intellect.
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INFERENTIAL STRUCTURE
While the assimilative character of the poet's argument presents an external
framework in which to outline many of La Fontaine's main arguments, the internal consistency of his discourse relies on the inferential structure of his
rhetoric. In Cartesian terms, inferential structure of thought refers to the logical
derivations of consequences given a presupposed set of concepts. Daniel Garber
interprets inferential structure in Descartes as the discovery of causes via effects
through experimentation. He uses the following excerpt of Part VI of the
Discours de la methode:
Puts, lorsque j'ai voulu descendre a celles qui etaient particulieres, il s'en est tant presente a moi de divers, que je n'ai
pas cru qu'il fut possible a 1'esprit humain de distinguer les
formes ou especes de corps qui sont sur la terre d'une infinite,
d'autres qui pourraient y etre, si c'eut ete Ie vouloir de Dieu de
les y mettre, ni, par consequent, de les rapporter a notre visage,
si ce n'est qu'on vienne au-devant des causes par les effets, et
qu'on se serve de plusieurs experiences particulieres. (1:11220)
Garber claims that the passage suggests a form of reasoning from effects to
causes through a version of the hypothetico-deductive method. This method then,
would consist of "making experiments, gathering the results, and framing a hypothesis that would explain the results in terms of... [assumed] principles" (127).
While Garber contends later that Descartes seems to endorse other kinds of argument over the hypothetical, he nonetheless states: "The evidence in favor of the
claim that Descartes was seriously committed to hypothetical arguments in science...is substantial" (127).
What sort of link exists between Cartesian reasoning and La Fontaine's
mode of argument in his Discourse I maintain that the structure of La Fontaine's
fable resembles that of the hypothetico-deductive method, with one possible
variation. This variation centers on the meaning of "experience" in Descartes as
well as in Garber's translation. For Garber, "experience" signifies "experiment"
in the sense of the scientific method (126). Descartes is less clear, with either being equally admissible: the scientific meaning or the more general notion of
knowledge that results from participation or observation.
The question arises as to which concept of "experience" most accurately applies to La Fontaine. On the most apparent level, the second definition best fits
since the poet's descriptions of animal defense and cunning appear more as reported and personal observations than as preconceived tests or controlled opera111
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tions. Yet, the notion of experiment as test is germane to La Fontaine's mode of
argument in that each example—be it the partridge that pretends to sport a broken wing to save her family, or the boubaks that employ sophisticated battle
techniques—puts Descartes's claims to the test and refutes them. If indeed La
Fontaine employs his Discours to experiment with Cartesian theory, then the
scientific definition of "experience" merits greater attention.
Interestingly, the idea that La Fontaine's discursive technique in his
Discours resembles a form of experimentation with Descartes's method coincides
with the notion of inferential structure. Here, Busson and Gohin's outline of the
poem becomes useful in tracing the derivation of La Fontaine's claims (45).
After the poet's introductory praise of Madame de La Sabliere, (vv. 1-23), he
moves to an explanation of Cartesian theory which Busson and Gohin divide
into a) "1'automatisme" (24-52) and b) "la pensee et la reflexion" (53-68). In this
section on "automatisme" La Fontaine announces the primary Cartesian principle he intends to challenge, "Que la bete est une machine" (v. 30). The challenges to the principle take the form of counter-examples to Descartes's assertions. Busson and Gohin label this third section "Objections de La Fontaine aux
Cartesiens," with each "objection" illustrated by an instance of animal intelligence.
As mentioned, these examples include the 1) buck which, upon hearing the
barks of hunting dogs, sacrifices a younger member of the herd to stave off the
attackers (vv. 68-81); 2) the mother partridge feigning a broken wing so as to divert a group of hunters (vv. 82-91); 3) the Canadian beavers whose genius in
collective dam building surpasses man's (vv. 92-121); and 4) the sophisticated
attack and defense strategies of the Ukrainian boubaks (vv. 122-39). These
observations act as effects stemming from a first cause, namely the animals'
possession of some kind of "esprit." What is interesting to note about La
Fontaine's exposition of cause and effect is the way in which he leads the reader
through the inferential process.
Even before La Fontaine lists the examples that anchor his argument, he
asks the reader to make inferences that undermine Descartes. In his explanation
of Cartesianism (vv. 24-68), La Fontaine begins his refutation by assailing
Descartes's comparison of animals to clocks. Framing his objections literally as
a dichotomy of "us" versus "them," La Fontaine summarizes Descartes's theory
in the following manner:
Au dire de ces gens, la bete est toute telle:
L'objet Ie frappe en un endroit;
Ce lieu frappe s'en va tout droit,
Selon nous, au voisin en porter la nouvelle;
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Le sens de proche en proche aussitot la recoit.
L'impression se fait, mais comment se fait-elle?
Selon eux, par necessite,
Sans passion, sans volonte.
(vv. 39-46)

The inference to be drawn from Descartes's principle is that if animals are nothing more than clocks, they, unlike humans, are devoid of consciousness:
Qu'est-ce done? Une montre. Et nous? Cest autre chose.
Voici la facon que Descartes 1'expose.
(vv. 52-53)

La Fontaine infers from Descartes that if animals have no real thought, they in
turn do not truly exist. This inference is most fully expressed in La Fontaine's
adaptation of the cogito, which immediately follows:
Voici, dis-je, comment raisonne cet auteur.
Sur tous les animaux, enfants du Createur,
Fai le don de penser etje sais queje pense.
Or vous savez. Iris, de certaine science,
Que, quand la bete penserait,
La bete ne reflechirait
Sur Fobjet ni sur sa pensee.
Descartes va plus loin et soutient nettement
Qu'elle ne pense nullement.
(vv.58-66)

The goal then, of the specific observations that come directly afterwards is not
only to prove that animals think, and therefore are, but, in Cartesian fashion,
that their essence derives from their ability to think. Though deprived of the capacity to "reflect" (v. 63), animals, according to La Fontaine, constitute sentient
beings, i.e. creatures "conscious or percipient of something; having the power or
function of sensation or of perception of the senses" (Oxford English Dictionary
993). Animals thus move beyond the sphere of mere objects, claiming their part
of the kernel of general esprit.
ESPRIT, BON SENS, AND SUBVERSION OF DESCARTES

Much of this notion of general "esprit" is enveloped in the Cartesian idea of
"bon sens." For La Fontaine, "bon sens" operates on two levels in the text, re113
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lating to animal behavior and reader reception. It is reasonable to equate "bon
sens," in both the Cartesian and Lafontainian senses, with the capacity to "bien
juger" (Discours, Robinet edition 21). Animals show astute judgment by devising various stratagems to save their lives, while the human reader demonstrates
it by recognizing that animals do indeed possess "bon sens." The term's appearance in the text, at the end of the poet's description of the boubaks, amplifies La
Fontaine's argument on several levels:
Corps de garde avance, vedettes, espions,
Embuscades, partis, et mille inventions
D'une pernicieuse et maudite science,
Fille du Styx et mere des heros
Exercent de ces animaux
Le bon sens et 1'experience.
Pour chanter leurs combats, 1'Acheron nous devrait
Rendre Homere. Ah s'il le rendait,
Et qu'il rendit aussi le rival d'Epicure,
Que dirait ce dernier sur ces exemples-ci?
(vv. 130-39)

Structurally, the term "bon sens" reframes La Fontaine's argument, while advancing it at the same time. "Bon sens" highlights a demarcation in the poem
between the illustrations of animal intelligence, which make up "La Fontaine's
objections to Descartes," and the next section of the Discours, which Busson and
Gohin entitle the "Response of the Cartesians" (vv. 140-78). While
summarizing the poet's, as well as the attentive reader's conclusions about
animal cognition, "bon sens" also brings Descartes directly back into the fray.
La Fontaine's four examples of animal thought do not mention Descartes
despite the poet's intention to employ the examples as a means of refuting the
geometer. The poet waits over seventy lines before reinvoking "le rival d'Epicure" (v. 138) in part to let the instances of animal thinking prowess stand on
their own merits. Not until after all the illustrations are noted, do the ideas of
"bon sens" and "experience" (v. 135) return the reader to the dispute at hand. The
rhetorical question in verse 139 ("Que dirait ce dernier sur ces exemples-ci?")
leads to further debate, either from Cartesians or from those who La Fontaine believes have a more reasonable point of view.
It is clear La Fontaine believes that animals, as well as objective readers,
exercise "bon sens" based on their experience. One can infer that the poet believes the opposite of Descartes, i.e., that the philosopher bases little of his reasoning on the "bon sens" and "experience" he claims to espouse. La Fontaine's
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examples of animal intelligence, as the exotic settings of Canada and Ukraine
suggest, have a certain universal quality about them. The illustrations deal with
basic survival strategies, underscoring a commonality that invites any thoughtful
reader to provide additional examples. La Fontaine's conclusion that animals display "bon sens" by inventing different means of self-preservation is, in Cartesian
terms, "evident," or self-evident. Evidence refers to the derivation or illumination
of a truth that the holder deems indubitable. The poet declares such an "evidence"
after praising the engineering faculties of the Canadian beavers:
Que ces castors ne soient qu'un corps vuide d'esprit,
Jamais on ne pourra m'obliger a Ie croire.
(vv.114-15)
Emerging from the poem is La Fontaine's position that the principles of "bon
sens," "experience," or evidence are basically absent from Descartes's reflections.
Interestingly, the "Response of the Cartesians," is devoid of concrete examples
and hard conclusions. The Cartesians fail to respond scientifically to La
Fontaine's objections and merely repeat shopworn speculations on animal memory:
Que la memoire est corporelle...
L'objet, lorsqu'il revient, va dans son magasin
Chercher par Ie meme chemin
L'image auparavant tracee,
Qui sur les memes pas revient pareillement,
Sans Ie secours de la pensee.
(vv. 145-50)

While one can accuse La Fontaine of placing a truncated, rather simplistic reply
in the mouths of the Cartesians, it is true that in Part VI of the Discours de la
methode, the geometer's argument is more speculative than factual. But what is
more important about the above quote is La Fontaine's use of animals to describe Cartesians. Like the animals to which the poet refers, Cartesians have a
mechanical memory, reacting to challenges in rote, predictable fashion.
Cartesians, bereft of the judgment that comes with adapting to different experiences, can only retrace their steps when confronting a new obstacle. La
Fontaine's depiction of animals thus depends on the point of view he asserts at a
given moment: smart and flexible when advancing his own "gassendiste" argument, automatic and rigid when discussing Descartes. In an ironic turn, then, La
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Fontaine appears to "animalize" Descartes, perhaps to show the "primitive" nature of the philosopher's theories.
Rhetorically, this section of the poem becomes important because La
Fontaine makes his final criticism of Descartes before setting forth his own hypothesis. La Fontaine's greatest objection is to the geometer's assertion of absolute certainty regarding the causes behind the notion of general "esprit." The poet
counters Descartes's claim that ontology can be defined in human, rational
terms, arguing instead for the presence of a kind of mystery:
Un esprit vit en nous, et meut tous nos ressorts;
L'impression se fait. Le moyen, je 1'ignore.
On ne 1'apprend qu'au sein de la Divinite;
Et, s'il faut en parler avec sincerite,
Descartes 1'ignorait encore.
(vv. 166-70)

Specifically, La Fontaine's dispute with Descartes concerns the philosopher's belief that the body consists only of matter, while the soul is comprised of
thought. While La Fontaine later argues for a greater compatibility between body
and soul, his main disagreement pertains to Descartes's overall claims to certitude of knowledge. As the poet states in verses 168-70, absolute knowledge of
the forces behind existence come only through union with God. La Fontaine's
assertion, in verses 169 and 170, that Descartes himself would have to be dead to
make any avowal of certainty, attacks the core of the latter's theories, based on
the supposed universal character of the cogito. La Fontaine's gassendisme begins
to manifest itself in the sense that the poet covertly accuses Descartes of dogmatism. Gassendi criticizes dogmatism because it "exaggerates the power of the
human mind" (Popkin 142). In his Discours, La Fontaine impugns what he sees
as overestimation of the capacity of the human mind to discern absolute truths.
The claim to know anything with certitude before death also smacks of human
arrogance, mocking the arrogation of Divine omniscience. Relativism, based on
"bon sens" and common experience, become the closest approximations to the
truth, and thus provide the most effective means for continuing philosophical
debate.
THE CASE FOR RELATIVISM

Toward the end of the "Cartesian's response," the reader notices the first
glimpses of La Fontaine's relativist theory of the animal and human soul. La
Fontaine's relativism finds its origin in Renaissance humanist philology.
Zachary Sayre Schiffman notes that this philology "held forth the possibility
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that all laws and institutions were relative to their historical circumstance, potentially undermining the evidence of normative standards" (6). Concepts of relativism, which emphasize the particular, conditional nature of a thing or idea, undergird many of La Fontaine's distinctions concerning the idea of "esprit."
While La Fontaine accedes to the idea of a "principe intelligent" (v. 157), which
allows both man and animal to exercise rational judgment, the degree to which
the "principe" manifests itself in the two species is vastly different:
Ce queje sais, Iris, c'est qu'en ces animaux
Dontje viens de citer 1'exemple,
Cet esprit n'agit pas: 1'homme seui est son temple.
Aussi faut-il donner a 1'animal un point
Que la plante, apres tout, n'a point.
(vv. 72-76)

In listing a hierarchy of mental faculties descending from man to animals to
plants, La Fontaine categorizes his concept of "esprit" according to the logic of
"bon sens." The apologue Les deux rats, Ie renard et I'oeuf which follows this
declaration, reaffirms the poet's belief in animal intelligence. After describing the
ingenuity of the rats who hide their dinner from a fox, the poet exclaims:
Qu'on m'aille soutenir, apres un tel recit,
Que les betes n'ont point d'esprit!
(vv. 197-98)

Such a reaffirmation stems, in part, from the poet's fear that his previous categorization will somehow diminish his overall argument. It is at this point that La
Fontaine fully introduces his gassendiste theory of the animal soul. The theory,
postulating that animals have a "material" (v. 207) soul, puts the animal soul on
a footing with children's souls "capable de sentir, juger rien davantage,/ Etjuger
imparfaitement" (vv. 215-16). La Fontaine's adult human soul shares the traits
of the animal/child soul, yet carries a transcendent quality, placing it just below
the angel soul. The poet explains the "double tresor" (v. 220) of the cultivated
adult soul in the following terms:
L'un, cette ame pareille en tous tant que nous sommes,
Sages, fous, enfants, idiots,
Hotes de 1'univers, sous Ie nom d'animaux,
L'autre, encore une autre ame, entre nous et les anges
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Commune en un degre;
Et ce tresor a part cree
Suivrait parmi les airs les celestes phalanges,
Entrerait dans un point sans en etre presse,
Ne finiraitjamais, quoique ayant commence,
Choses reelles, quoique etranges.
(vv. 221-30)

Gassendi's influence is evident, not only from the notion of the hierarchy of
souls, but from the relativistic tenor of the passage. Of particular note is the use
of the conditional tense. The conditional signals a hypothesis, a reasonable supposition based on a set of circumstances. La Fontaine's hypothesis describes the
human soul relative to the animal; if, as he believes, the human soul is superior,
then it will reach a transcendent state inaccessible to the animal spirit. The idea
that the human soul would follow celestial phalanxes, would enter without
haste, and would never end (vv. 227-29), underscores the hypothetical, if not
speculative tenor of the proposition. Unlike Descartes, La Fontaine avoids any
notion of certitude. The entire section begins with the speculation in line 199,
"Pour moi si j'en etais Ie maitre," leaving the reader to judge the plausibility of
what follows.
Nonetheless, the personalized nature of the speculation warrants notice since
it evokes a similarity between La Fontaine and Descartes. La Fontaine's firstperson narration, articulated within an analytical framework, closely resembles
the narrative voice in Descartes's Discours. Descartes's "je" is at once reflective
and deductive, recounting both a personal and universal search for truth. La
Fontaine also combines forms of musing and inquiry, employing what he believes are facts to support his inclinations. The presence of the "je" in both
Descartes and La Fontaine renders an abstruse subject more accessible, demystifying and animating a scientific discourse which many readers could find obscure.
For La Fontaine, however, first person narration lends an air of subjectivity to
the process, a subjectivity that he believes permeates the writings of Descartes.
The idea that Descartes's theories were summarily subjective constituted one
of the major criticisms of the Discours de la methode. Popkin notes that
Gassendi believed Descartes "to be stressing...subjective, psychological experience as the basis of certitude rather than any objective features of the ideas or
what they may refer to" (202). Accordingly, if the Cartesian assumption that the
"clarity and distinctiveness" of an idea assures its truth, then the clarity and distinctiveness can be challenged, Popkin states, because it is uncertain as to
whether or not "[it is] really true, or...just that Descartes thinks it is true" (202).
La Fontaine's personalized style reflects not only the subjectivity and personal118
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ization he finds in Descartes's argument, but his own skepticism concerning the
validity of the Discours de la methode. In parodic fashion, the poet uses a personalized style to show his doubt about a system in which ostensibly objective,
absolute truth is derived from "an overwhelming [inner] compulsion (202)" devoid of common sense and external experience.
The poet's assertion in verses 166-70 that Descartes, or indeed anyone, can
know the absolute only in death, suggests that all human activity and reasoning
is grounded in relativism, since a relative perspective is the only one accessible
to humans. Much of La Fontaine's refutation of Descartes derives from what the
poet perceives as a basic flaw in the latter" s method; that totally objective, certain thinking on the human level is possible. La Fontaine's relativism intersects
with probabilism in that reliance on the plausible, as taken from the observed
circumstances, remains the only workable option for the sophisticated thinker.
The combination of first person narration coupled with analytical inquiry underscores the idea that human subjectivity, tempered by rational observation, produces the most dependable form of human knowledge.
The presence of subjectivity in La Fontaine's reasoning goes beyond narrative format. It touches upon the fundamental elements of the poet's argument,
specifically La Fontaine's manner of depicting animals to suit his purpose.
I shall next examine closely La Fontaine's portrayal of animals in the
Discours so as to determine the viability of the portrayal in terms of the poet's
thesis.
ANIMAL REPRESENTATION AND DEFINITION OF THE FABLE

Historically, the "fabulistes" represent animals in a highly stylized, i.e., anthropomorphic way. Animals often speak, scheme, love, and fight in a fashion
similar, if not identical, to humans. The idea that animal behavior in fables allegorizes human conduct is a basic tenet of the genre. For La Fontaine, such a portrayal is risky in his Discours because he argues that animals possess a mind and
soul in their own right. If animals appear too human, then the poet's basic
premise, while appearing reasonable on the level of "bon sens," collapses on the
level of hard, demonstrative proof. If, however. La Fontaine depicts animals in a
dry, colorless way, he comes dangerously close to paralleling Descartes's conclusions. The problem, then, in anthropomorphization, is for the poet to represent
his bucks, partridges, and beavers en soi, in a manner that suggests their autonomous faculties without portraying them as humans in beasts' skins. As
Richard Danner suggests. La Fontaine must refuse "to adopt the kind of anthropocentric attitude toward his characters that human readers are conditioned to expect" (6).
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Despite his argument, La Fontaine fails to achieve his goal. Analysis of the
four examples of animal intelligence described earlier reveals that the poet alludes
to many soi-disant "animal" traits in human terms. The illustration of the old
buck serves as a prime example:
L'animal charge d'ans, vieux cerf, et de dix cors,
En suppose un plus jeune, et 1" oblige par force
A presenter aux chiens une nouvelle amorce.
Que de raisonnements pour conserver ses jours!
Le retour sur ses pas, les malices, les tours,
Et le change, et cent stratagemes
Dignes des plus grands chefs, dignes d'un meilleur sort!
On le dechire apres sa mort:
Ce sont tous ses honneurs supremes.
(vv.73-81)

On the surface, the buck's action seems primal enough: he selects a younger
member of the pack to be devoured so that others may escape. The poet describes
the scene briefly, and since the animals do not speak, there is no debate over the
moral or practical ramifications of the buck's action. Indeed, the brevity and
simplicity with which the act is recounted, as well as the obviousness of the
act's value suggests a certain natural, regular quality intrinsic to animal
behavior. Yet, the general tone of La Fontaine's language indicates the
conventional fabulistic device of deploying animals as a metaphor for man.
Terms such as "malices" (v. 77), "tours" (v. 77), and "stratagemes" (v. 78) have
predominantly human connotations despite the poet's intention to describe basic
animal defense maneuvers. The ruses and honors the poet speaks of in verses 7881 clearly derive from human frames of reference, thus tightening the bond
between representations of human and animal. La Fontaine's failure to separate
animal from human consciousness and behavior is mirrored primarily in the
absence of a language that allows non-anthropomorphic description of animal
sentience. Though reflected by language, or more precisely the inadequacy of
language, La Fontaine's problem is more than a linguistic one. Rather, it is a
problem of accessibility and experience. While La Fontaine may witness and
sense what he and others perceive as distinctive animal thought and action, the
poet can only employ his modes of thought and expression in relating this
behavior to others. As the poet has only human frames of reference to convey
his observations, analogy, as expressed through anthropomorphization, becomes
inevitable. In this instance. La Fontaine cannot play the role of translator, where
the interpreter ostensibly knows the "languages," i.e., the sets of social,
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cognitive, and communicative circumstances, of the parties involved. Instead,
because the poet's experiences are one-sided, his viewpoint is necessarily onesided, forcing him to revert to conventions with which he, and his public, are
familiar.
The same situation occurs in the depiction of the partridge and beavers.
From one standpoint, both are treated as instances of a particular animal behavior
observed in nature. Virtually silent, methodical, but completely aware, the partridge fakes a wound to distract assailants and preserve her young, while the
beavers retain flood waters and build a canal joining the two shores. Like the
buck, the partridge and beavers engage in acts of self-preservation, with the poet
neither problematizing nor morally evaluating their behavior. Nevertheless, the
poet endows the partridge and beavers with what resembles human characteristics. The partridge bids farewell to her would-be attackers and laughs as she takes
flight. Likewise, the poet describes a chain of command in the beavers' dam assembly where the old dictate the actions of the young:
Chaque castor agit: commune est la tache;
Le vieux y fait marcher lejeune sans relache;
Maint maitre d'oeuvre y court, et tient hautIe baton.
(vv. 102-104)
The partridge's laugh, as well as use of the term "maitre d'oeuvre" provide an especially anthropomorphic dimension to La Fontaine's animals. I would argue
that these rather strident anthropomorphic qualities turn La Fontaine's animals
into metaphors of human behavior. Consequently, the human representation of
the animals subverts the poet's attempt to portray animals in their own right.
What effect, then, does this traditional kind of anthropomorphization exercise on the poem as a whole? First, La Fontaine's depiction of beasts does not in
any way hinder the poet in deploying Cartesian method and style to undermine
the philosopher's reasoning. Use of "bon sens," "experience" and the cogito to
refute Descartes remains unaffected by the intergeneric comparison of animal
with human-beings. The validity of La Fontaine's project does not rest solely on
his ability to portray beasts in a non-anthopomorphic way. Rather, validity
hinges largely on proposing plausible challenges to Descartes. In Cartesian fashion, La Fontaine strives to produce doubt with regard to previously accepted
norms of thought. Second, conventional anthropomorphization helps readers interpret the poem as a fable. Somewhat ironically, La Fontaine's failure to find a
"juste milieu" between fabulistic and real animals aids in the poem's generic definition. As mentioned earlier, the problems in labeling this work are numerous.
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The irregular title of the poem, in which the standard notation of the term
"Fable," followed by a sequential number gives way to the more declarative
Discours a Madame de La Sabliere, immediately raises questions about the poem's generic classification. Hence the basic question: Why does La Fontaine not
entitle this poem a fable?
Upon close examination, however, the work's structure, technique and end
reflect what David Lee Rubin describes as "an inductive formal definition of
fable." With respect to structure, La Fontaine's Discours is made up of two
parts: apologue and exposition. Apologue assumes two different forms in the
text: the four illustrations of animal intelligence and the brief tale entitled Les
deux rats, Ie renard et I'oeuf. While the four illustrations seem more integrated
into the exposition—the "abstract statement(s) for which the apologue serves as
evidence" (12)—than does the tale Les deux rats, both are "theme-dominated
narratives and descriptions which combine deductive (allegorical), inductive
(exemplary) and analogical (intergeneric, i.e., beast fable) modes to illustrate and
explicate the exposition" (12). Here, exposition refers to the philosophical
reasonings behind the differing theories of animal intelligence. In particular. La
Fontaine's use of exempla and analogy within the apologue(s) places the poem
within the boundaries of fable. Technique in La Fontaine's Discours tends to
problematize the text (13-14). The poet's illustrations reveal a sense of both
incompleteness and anti-closure, as marked by the general interrogative style and
the specific rhetorical questions posed either to Iris or to the implied reader. If
one applies Rubin's definition, then the Discours a Madame de La Sabliere
constitutes a "problematic," "reader-active" fable (11), whose goal is to pose
literary and philosophical questions for the reader's contemplation.
Thus, as in Les souris et Ie Chat-huant, La Fontaine does not call his
Discours a fable perhaps because his intention and/or need to portray real animals
as opposed to fabulistic ones would violate one of the genre's fundamental criteria. However, as Rubin has shown in his reading of Les souris (92-95), reliance
on the stylized, analogical portrayal of animals is not required to ascribe the term
"fable" to a given poem.
What then, differentiates this poem not only from the fables in Book IX,
but from those in the Recueil as a whole? The most significant distinction
comes from the poet's attempt, despite the failure noted above, to reverse conventional notions of the fable. This reversal must be considered on two levels.
Although the poet does not succeed in portraying real as opposed to conventional
animals, he does manage, however briefly, to transpose the constitutive relationships in the fables' traditional man-beast allegory. While animals portray humans in conventional fables, in La Fontaine's Discours, the poet, at certain
moments in the text, seeks to use humans as representations of animals. For ex122
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ample, the Cartesian notion of the animal, as described in lines 145-50, is, for
La Fontaine, quite representative of Descartes and his followers: mechanical, obstinate, and uncreative. By contrast, La Fontaine's theory of animal thought and
behavior mirrors the depiction of the poet, if not the gassendistes in general: intelligent, adaptable, inventive. Although La Fontaine is bound by tradition and
frame of reference to subordinate animal experience to the human, he aspires,
when comparing Descartes with Gassendi, to subordinate the human to the animal in order to convey his general sentiment about animal cognition.
This is not to say that the goal of the poem is to argue the merits of animals over humans. As mentioned, fables such as La perdrix et les coqs have as
their underlying premise the intellectual and moral superiority of beast over man.
The Discours' goals are more existential: to prove the cognitive existence of animals via their own thought, and to show that thought is a faculty extending beyond the realm of humankind. Curiously, human thought for La Fontaine,
though more sophisticated than its animal counterpart, is, at least in this poem,
more fallible. The poet's success in subverting Descartes by using the latter's
methods attests to the vulnerability of human thought. In this work, animal
vulnerability is primarily physical and is countered with an adaptability to material challenges. As human vulnerability is more mental in nature, humankind
must find cognitive means of adjustment in order to survive.
Subtly, La Fontaine's Discours applies this process of evolution to poetry
itself. The poet at first speaks of an attempt to praise Iris in a conventional
manner which, in the poet's words, "n'est que trop aise." Iris's refusal to accept
the "louange" renders the poet vulnerable since he must now find an innovative
way of paying tribute to his patron. He accomplishes this goal by writing a
"discours" that mixes the lyric, science, philosophy, and "eloge." La Fontaine's
choice to detail the virtues of animal intelligence as a hymn of praise for his patron reflects his appreciation of Madame de La Sabliere's ability to foster an environment where science and the lyric converge to further intellectual debate.
Poetry and public evolve to higher levels while the poet evolves to the status of
philosopher in his own right. The three, much like the animals that La Fontaine
defends, reach a more elevated level of existence, the essence of which is the ability to cultivate and apply thought.
NOTES
1. Collinet notes that La Fontaine could have known the text before its publication. See pp. 1240-41 of his 1991 edition of the Oeuvres completes. All
quotations from the Fables are taken from this edition unless otherwise noted.
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2. This debate was actually carried out over several years. See Jasinski,
Revue d'histoire de philosophic 1 (1933) 316-30 and 2 (1934) 218-24: and
Revue d'histoire litteraire de la France 42 (1935) 401-7 and 43 (1936), 317-20.
For Busson's contributions, see RHL 42 (1935), 1-32, and 631-36 and 43 (1936)
257-86.
3. See also Busson and Gohin's critical edition of the Discours a Madame de
La Sabliere, 24-29.
4. Collinet makes a brief statement to this effect in his 1991 edition.
However, his treatment of Le Discours a Madame de La Sabliere as a refutation
of the Discours de la methode is limited to thematic considerations, specifically
those regarding theories of animal intelligence, cf. 1239-40.
5. Bordas edition, vol. 2, 134-35.
6. The term "exposition" appears in quotes because it is adapted from the
poem itself. In vv. 52-53, La Fontaine chides Descartes's mechanistic interpretation of animal behavior saying:
Qu'est-ce done? Une montre. Et nous? Cest autre chose.
Voici la fa^on que Descartes 1'expose.
7. Note that poem starts with an immediate address to Iris.
8. Fumaroli, 1:377. Collinet, 1242. Both editors stress the allusion to
Parnassus.
9. The first category "contains no references to the narratee" (13). It is made
up of direct statements which, while perhaps eliciting some sentiment on the
part of the reader for the characters, do not directly evoke the narratee.
10. See lines 72-135, in which the poet details the cognitive skill of an aging buck, a partridge, Canadian beavers, and the Ukrainian boubaks.
11. Consult the second and third Meditations, pp. 420-30, 440-43, Alquie
edition. Note that the Meditations (1638-40) were published after the Discours de
la methode (1637).
12. See verses 156-58 of La Fontaine's Discours'.
Tout obeit dans ma machine a ce principe intelligent
II [F esprit] est distinct du corps, et se con^oit nettement.
13. For a full explanation of Gassendi's theory of the soul, see Olivier
Bloch's La philoshophie de Gassendi. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971. pp.
363-65.
14. As noted earlier, La Fontaine does use the term in the text itself. See
verse 25.
15. For a full definition, consult page 12 of A Pact With Silence.
16. See Rubin's interpretation of a "real animal" as "one whose deeds and
motivations are taken literally, rather than by analogy with those of humans"
(94).
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